Presidk web skimmer
Presidk is a server-side PrestaShop skimmer that swaps the checkout's payment step for its own card form and sends the card from the store's server. We have matched it on 328 stores since 21 November.
Presidk in numbers
Since 21 November, the first Presidk match in our records, counted on 21 November 2026. How we count.
| Stores with Presidk code | 328 |
|---|---|
| Most recent match | 21 November |
| Stores captured since 25 September | 319 |
The skimmer runs inside PrestaShop
Presidk is PHP code planted in a PrestaShop store. It works through the store's own header and payment hooks, HOOK_HEADER and HOOK_PAYMENT, and puts a card form of its own where the checkout's payment step should be. The form and its script arrive in the store's HTML, and the card leaves later from the store's server, so the shopper's browser never contacts the collector.
Its string table leaks into the store's links
The skimmer keeps its strings in a numbered PHP array. On infected stores that array also turns up URL-encoded in the store's alternate and language links, as a query string that starts ?[0]=getContext&[1]=Presta_Shop&[2]=base64_decode. A store page we captured on 21 November 2026 carried it in 16 links. The table has 92 entries, among them curl_exec, authorizenet_expiration, __Pres_idk and the complete HTML of the card form, so most of the skimmer reads straight from the page source. The family name comes from the __Pres_idk entry.
A card form in place of the payment step
On page load, a script from the table finds the payment step, checkout-payment-step in the default checkout or onepagecheckoutps_step_three in the One Page Checkout PS module, and fills it with a Base64-decoded form. Another entry renames the store's HOOK_PAYMENT element to PAYMENT_HOOK. The form asks for the card holder, a 16-digit number, the month, a four-digit year and a CVV in a password field.
Every field calls check_cc(event) on each key press. Once the number has 16 digits, the CVV three, the month starts with 0 or 1 and the year with 20, the script joins the values as number|MM/YYYY|CVV|holder, writes them Base64-encoded to a Presta_Shop cookie and covers the page with a spinner.
The server sends the card with curl
The PHP entries read the cookie back with base64_decode and split it on |. The skimmer looks up the cart's delivery address with SELECT id_address_delivery FROM cart WHERE id_cart=, then posts the card and the address with curl_init and curl_exec to collector URLs stored Base64-encoded in the table. The tables we read point to two raw IP addresses over HTTPS. The post uses Magento's checkout field names, such as billing[street][], cc_number, cc_cid, cc_owner and authorizenet_expiration, and adds the shopper's user agent, IP address and a JSON block tagged U1BO.
Checking a store
Look in the page source, the checkout and the server for:
- alternate or language links whose query string contains
getContext,Presta_Shopor__Pres_idk - a payment step holding a card holder, number, expiry and CVV form with
check_cc(event)handlers - an element with the id
PAYMENT_HOOKwhere the theme hasHOOK_PAYMENT - a
Presta_Shopcookie set after card entry - outbound HTTPS connections from the web server to raw IP addresses
Search the store's PHP files for __Pres_idk and the Base64 collector strings to find the injected code, and remove it. Rotate the back-office, hosting and database credentials, and check the checkout again from a clean browser profile.