Web threats / Watering holes

AskSocket watering-hole kit

AskSocket is a 2.5 KB script on Chinese-language adult-comic and gossip sites. It finds its controller in a DNS TXT record, holds a WebSocket open to it and runs the code it sends. We have matched it on 5 sites since 12 October.

AskSocket in numbers

Since 12 October, the first AskSocket match in our records, counted on 16 November 2026. How we count.

Sites with AskSocket code5
Sites with a match in the last 30 days4
Operator hosts our rules matched1
New sites in October5
Sites captured since 25 September5

One script tag on every site

AskSocket is a 2,485-byte script loaded with a plain script tag in the page's HTML, from m.mod-js[.]org/js/<id>. The sites we match are Chinese-language adult-comic and gossip sites on .wiki and .cc domains. Public URLScan scans show the same script on more sites of the same kind.

Every site we matched loads the same script URL. The script sends the 32-hex-character id from that path to the controller, so the controller knows which deployment a visitor came through. The script also sets window.___as and quits if it is already set, so a page that loads it twice opens one channel.

We named AskSocket after its XOR key, ask123321, and the WebSocket it holds open.

A DNS record names the controller

The script asks four DNS-over-HTTPS services in turn for the TXT record of xs[.]mmp-gep[.]org: Alibaba's dns.alidns.com and 223.5.5.5, Google and Cloudflare. It takes the first answer, Base64-decodes it, URL-decodes it and XORs it with ask123321xor. The result is the controller's host, so far a name under mcp-source[.]online.

The operator moves every site to a new controller by editing one TXT record. The contract tracker reads that name every day and shows the host it decodes to today.

When the connection fails with code 1006, the script looks up a second name, error[.]xs[.]mmp-gep[.]org, once per page. The operator runs the DNS for that domain, so the lookup reports a visitor who could not connect. That record answers with a fixed placeholder.

The controller decides what runs

The script makes two random 32-character ids, one for the visitor and one for the connection, and opens:

wss://[controller]/?u=[visitor id]&p=[script id]&c=[connection id]

It then asks for init-code. The reply is XOR-encoded with the visitor id, and the script runs it with eval. That code becomes the handler: every later message goes to its handleMessage. A heartbeat goes out every 50 seconds, and a dropped connection retries after 10 seconds, doubling up to 5 minutes, with random jitter.

The script also carries an unused helper that adds a hidden blank frame and hands that frame's eval to a callback, ready for code the controller sends.

We have not seen what the controller sends. Each reply is keyed by the visitor id the browser made up for that visit, and none of our captures holds one.

What we see

MonthNew sites
September0
October5
November so far0

Who else points at the controller

Infoblox reported on 15 September 2026 that casino sites linked to the PeckBirdy framework open WebSocket connections to mcp-source[.]online (Infoblox). AskSocket's record points at a host under that domain. The code is not the PeckBirdy that Trend Micro described in January 2026, which encrypts its channel with AES keyed by an attack id and carries its host and port in the script, so we track AskSocket under its own name.

Checking a site

Open the site with the browser's network panel and look for:

  • a script from m.mod-js[.]org/js/ followed by a 32-hex-character id
  • DNS-over-HTTPS TXT lookups for xs[.]mmp-gep[.]org or error[.]xs[.]mmp-gep[.]org
  • a WebSocket to a host under mcp-source[.]online with u, p and c parameters
  • window.___as set after the page loads

Remove the script tag from the site's templates and purge every cache. Any visitor who loaded a page with the tag may have run code from the controller.

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