A watering hole turns a site's readers into the operator's audience.
A watering hole is a site whose visitors an operator wants to reach. The scripts we track open a live channel from each visitor's browser to a controller and run the code it sends, so the operator decides later what every reader gets. Since 1 August we have matched watering-hole scripts on 38 sites.
Watering holes in numbers
Since 1 August, when our rule-match records begin, counted on 16 November 2026. How we count.
| Sites with a watering-hole script | 38 |
|---|---|
| Sites with a match in the last 30 days | 21 |
| New sites in October | 20 |
| Named kits | 2 |
Kits compared
Kits with the most sites in the last 30 days first. One site can carry more than one kit. The last column counts sites recaptured at least 25 days after their first match, where there are at least 50.
Smart contracts
One of these kits reads 3 contracts on Ethereum Sepolia. Today they return 3 destinations.
A watering-hole script does not carry the attack itself. It connects each visitor's browser to a controller and waits. Whatever the controller sends runs in the page, so the operator can pick visitors, change the payload or stay quiet, all without touching the site again.
site a chosen audience reads
-> planted script
-> looks up the controller (DNS record or smart contract)
-> WebSocket from the visitor's browser to the controller
-> controller sends code, the page runs it
MITRE ATT&CK files this under Drive-by Compromise (T1189), where a watering hole is the targeted form: the operator picks the site for who reads it.
The controller is found at run time
None of these scripts names its controller in plain text. AskSocket reads a DNS TXT record over DNS-over-HTTPS and XOR-decodes the host from it. NfSocket reads an encoded host from a smart contract on the Sepolia test network, as EtherHiding kits do, caches it in localStorage and XOR-decodes it into the WebSocket address. Changing one record moves every page to a new controller.
The contract tracker reads those contracts and DNS names every day.
Code arrives over the open channel
Once the WebSocket is open, the script runs what it receives. AskSocket runs the controller's first reply with eval and hands every later message to the code that reply defined. NfSocket runs each message with new Function. A third pattern hides the executor inside a Google OAuth-revoke JSONP request: the page asks accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke with a callback that decodes and runs the attacker's code.
The page itself carries nothing that shows what a visitor received. That code lives only in the controller's replies, often encrypted per visit.
Sites we see it on
AskSocket sits in the HTML of Chinese-language adult-comic and gossip sites on .wiki and .cc domains. NfSocket is appended to sites' own copies of jquery-migrate.min.js. iPhone exploit gates on compromised sites are watering holes too; they have their own page, iOS exploit kits.
What we see
| Month | New sites |
|---|---|
| September | 9 |
| October | 20 |
| November so far | 9 |
Checking a site
Open the site with the browser's network panel and look for:
- a WebSocket opened by the page to a host the site never names
- DNS-over-HTTPS TXT lookups (
dns-query,dns.google/resolve,dns.alidns.com/resolve) made by the page eth_callrequests to public RPC nodes from a page with no wallet features- a script tag after
</body>that points ataccounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revokewith a longcallbackvalue
Remove the planted tag or appended code, compare theme and plugin files with trusted copies, and purge every cache. A visitor who loaded the page while the channel was open may have run code the page no longer shows.