Web threats / Watering holes

NfSocket watering-hole kit

NfSocket is a loader appended to a site's copy of jQuery Migrate. It reads its controller's host from a contract on the Sepolia test network, holds a WebSocket open to it and runs every message it sends. We have matched it on 7 sites since 26 October.

NfSocket in numbers

Since 26 October, the first NfSocket match in our records, counted on 16 November 2026. How we count.

Sites with NfSocket code7
Sites with a match in the last 30 days7
New sites in October1
Sites captured since 25 September6

Appended to jQuery Migrate

NfSocket is added to the end of a site's own jquery-migrate.min.js, the compatibility script WordPress loads from /wp-includes/js/jquery/. The file keeps working as jQuery Migrate, so the site looks normal. The appended code is obfuscated with obfuscator.io.

We named NfSocket after the [nf] prefix its newer builds put on their log messages, such as [nf] eval frame failed:, and the WebSocket it holds open. Those builds also set window.__nfHost and window.__nfBoot. An older build we matched carries neither, but its string table encodes the same key, selector, socket path and socket variable to the same tokens.

A Sepolia contract names the controller

The loader calls selector 0x20965255 on a contract on Sepolia, Ethereum's test network, through public RPC services such as PublicNode. The contract answers with a Base64 string. The loader decodes it and XORs it with the key asd2d342t, which gives the controller's host, and caches the result in localStorage.

We have seen three contracts:

  • 0x2dd4665e290472402a3367fcbff50694688a3785
  • 0x66e065c8f16c3e4709f675d11723625033be7bfc
  • 0xd1a1c74b0213169b6faa0ab8f157de6b690eba33

The operator moves every site to a new controller with one transaction. The contract tracker reads all three every day and shows where each points today.

The controller decides what runs

The loader opens:

wss://[controller]/common?source=[page URL]

and keeps the socket in window['ww_f7423cd0']. Every message the controller sends is run as code with new Function. The page URL in the query tells the controller which site the visitor is on.

We have not seen what the controller sends. The page holds nothing of it; it exists only in the socket's messages.

What we see

MonthNew sites
September0
October1
November so far6

Checking a site

Open the site with the browser's network panel and look for:

  • jquery-migrate.min.js larger than the copy in a clean WordPress download, with obfuscated code after the jQuery Migrate source
  • eth_call requests to Sepolia RPC services from a page with no wallet features
  • a WebSocket to /common?source= on a host the site never names
  • window.ww_f7423cd0 or window.__nfBoot set after the page loads

Replace jquery-migrate.min.js with the copy from the matching WordPress release, find out how the file was changed, and purge every cache. Any visitor who loaded a page with the loader may have run code from the controller.

Contracts we read

We read 3 NfSocket contracts every day.

ChainContractCurrent destinationsLast changed
Ethereum Sepolia0x2dd4665e290472402a3367fcbff50694688a3785wodcass[.]com
Ethereum Sepolia0x66e065c8f16c3e4709f675d11723625033be7bfcwwodaghjhg[.]com
Ethereum Sepolia0xd1a1c74b0213169b6faa0ab8f157de6b690eba33woohals[.]com

The EtherHiding contract tracker keeps the full destination history.

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